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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
r

';I.

TAYLOR, et.£!.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

PETROLEUM COMPANY,
Jelawar'e COr'POr'ation, ~al.,

~~;:.,:.,1p~
1

Defendants-Respondents.

Consolidated Cases

'cS?H PAZZIO' et .£!.'

No. 19160
and

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 19161

'!.

?dC,LIP0 PETROLEUM COMPANY,

a Delawar'e cor'por'ation, et al.,

Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
RE:5PU!l0ENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS RAISES FACTUAL ISSUES

I.

Fr'om the Statement of Facts of the appellants' br'ief and in
'1e respondent's brief, it is clear that ther'e is a dispar'ity between
'''"

rsions of the facts of the r'espective par'ties in this case.
this is an Appeal fr'om a Motion to Dismiss under' Rule 12(b)(6)

P
•

r,

1:tah
,1

Rules of Civil Procedur'e these factual disputes pr'eclude

,,r the appellant-plaintiffs' case as a matter' of cour'se.

2

It is not the nature of this reply brief to peview these factual
disputes.

However, a reply should be made to certain factual

misconceptions which are contained in the respondent's brief.
Respondent makes note of, "Appellants' curious decision ts
make two lawsuits out of this dispute instead of one."
two lawsuits were brought because of the facts.
leased by the respondent.

Quite

sim,:~,

Certain lands were

Part of these lands were excluded from

participating in royalties from the Roosevelt Unit.

The

non-participating lands were subject to a different, superseding
lease, which was entered into by the parties more than two years afc'
the lands were excluded from the participating area.

Since there;,

very different factual situation which concerns only these
non-participating lands, a separate action was filed for them in

~'.'

court below.
Certain statements and matters which are stated in
respondent's Statement of Facts indicate that the respondent

appe!~

to be laboring under misconceptions of the facts.
Respondent first states that the 1946 lease er1tered into s.
the parties is different in the real property which the 1945 lease:
covered.
happened.

While this is literally true, it distorts what

actu~l~~

The 1945 leases executed by Wilford L. \.ihitlock,

(K.55) and Leslie B. Taylor, et ux,

(H.~CJ)

cover 12in1cc

Jn.~

~ ..

3

\fl Township 1 South,

Range 1 East and lands in Sections 23 and

• 7ownship 1 South, Range 1 West all in the Uintah Special
''. 2 rid1ar1.

The 1946 lease only covers those lands in Section 24.

c::.:.1b1ts to the lioosevelt Unit Agreement (which were omitted from the
respondent's Exhibit "A" to its Motion to Dismiss but which are
verlflej in one of the agreements of March 11, 1952, R.148) indicate
t~at

at the time respondent obtained the 1946 lease on the lands in
24 owned by the appellants and their predecessors in interest,

~e::ion

it also obtained leases on these other sections contained in the 1945

ieases.

In effect what it did was consolidate two leases into three

li:ases.

Although it is true that the actual delay rental paid on the
:~~S

lease is less than what was paid on the 1945 leases, there was no

:~1ange

in the rate at which the delay rental was paid, 1.e. 25¢ per

acre.

Respondent was required to pay that delay rental on all these

u\her lands which it purported

°''"'c1 in 1946.

to lease in 1945 and attempted to lease

Respondent's conclusion that the 1946 lease vastly

:l"fers from the 1945 leases just is not true.
Another misconception in respondent's statement of facts is
,"i

1ri

page six of its brief, wherein it states that the revision of

:•\al

partic1pat1n~

\~l~de

I'
1

t~e

area of the Roosevelt Unit, contracting the

lands in question was effective February 1, 1952,

weeks later the appellant, Audrey W. Taylor, her husband

PXecuted an agreement ratifying the terms of the unit

4

agreement.

This is not entirely correct.

The application for

approval of the first revised participating area for the Green hi 1 ,.
Formation (R.122) indicates that the application was not submitte1
until November 28, 1952, and only approved by the United States
Geologlcal Survey on January 13, 1953.

At the time the appellant

3 ,,

other lessors entered into the agreement, the application had note.•
been prepared.
Respondent mentions an agreement dated March 11, 1952,
whereby the lessors ratified the unit agreement.

However respor1den:

neglects to mention another agreement of that date between the

par'.i:

which indicates that, "Notwithstanding the provisions of the unit
agreement .•. unless lessee shall on or before November 12, 1952
commence or cause to be commenced operations for drilling a well
[on the leased property], the said lease shall terminate." (R.122,.
Certainly the existence of this second agreement is relevant to

t~

issues raised in the third cause of action of that case (Case No.
19161) which involves the non-participating lands.
This action revolves around the central fact that for o·:;:
37 years respondent has failed to develop certain lands it purports

hold under lease.

This is in spite of covenants implied in the ;e;•

and the second agreement of March 11, 1952, which expressly
the term of the lease and the unit agreement requiring the
of the property within a few short months.

~~ii'
1~

5
·1

fHL ADDITION OF MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS PRESENTED IN A

):i UNDEH THE CIVIL HULE 12(b) DOES NOT ALTER THE BURDE!J THAT MUST

BL BORNE BY THE RESPONDENT TO PREVAIL ON ITS MOTION TO DISMISS.

In an untitled portion of respondent's argument, respondent
1 ppears

to imply that because matters outside the pleadings were

c0 nsidered, and requested by the court below in ruling on respondent's
Motion to Dismiss, there exists a different burden which the
res~ondent

121b).

must meet to prevail on its Motion to Dismiss under Rule

This is just not the case.

Questions of fact may not be

resolved without a trial in any circumstance.

As stated by the United

.itates Supreme Court:
According to Rule 12(b) and its associated
Rule 56, summary judgment may be rendered only
if there are no genuine issues of fact to be
resolved.
The judgment is authorized only
where the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, where it is quite clear
what the truth is, and that no genuine issue
remains for trial. Sartor v. Arkansas Gas
Corporation, 321 U.S. 620, 623, 64 S. Ct. 724,
88 L. Ed. 967. 2A Moore's Federal Practice,
Paragraph 12.09 at 2311.
This court, in Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191
1tah 1975) has considered this issue in a situation procedurally
s'.milar to the present.
·l

01·

There, a complaint was filed to recover the

work and materials supplied to a private liquor club.

A

fie~ motion to dismiss was filed whereby the defendant claimed

JefenJant did not enter a contract with the plaintiff for the

6

In response to the motion, plaintiff filed an affidavit signed by,.
president alleging certain facts which would raise an issue as to
whether or not the defendant contracted for the services.

The tria;

court dismissed, but granted the plaintiff ten days to refile its
complaint.

The plaintiff appealed.
This court was unable to distinguish whether the trial co·"

ruled under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, but stated that the mere
existence of factual issues precluded summary disposition of the cas'
without trial:
It is not the purpose of summary judgment procedure
to judge the credibility of averments of the parties,
or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is
it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to
eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when
upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the
party ruled against, he would not be entitled to
prevail. Only when it so appears, is the court
justified in refusing such a party of the opportunity
of presenting his evidence and attempting to
persuade the fact trier to his views. Conversly,
if there is any dispute as to any issue, material
to the settlement of the controversy, the summary
judgment should not be granted. (At 193)
See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Production Credit
Association, 587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978); Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d
905 (Utah 1975)
III. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS DO NOT SUPPORT DIS'lISSAL OF TLJUSE 1 ~' 1L'
OF ACTION RELATIVE TO f\ESPOHDENT 'S BHCACH OF H1PLH~D CUVL'.JA;: ~:
A.

Inconsistent Causes of Action in the Complaint are
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Acr~_i''

In Section IA of respondent's ur·ief, it is statC;'J

'11 11

7

'lants'

claims based on the implied covenants are "fundamentally

·n~r.nsistent"

with appellants' other claims that the lease had

r•rninated or was never actually, lawfully in existence.
app~llants

The

have no quarrel with the fact that its claims are

'.;1consistent with each other, but questions the relevance respondent's
argument at the present stage of the proceedings.
telow was a Motion to Dismiss the complaint.

The motion brought

Under the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, inconsistent pleadings may be made and no election is
~equired

between them at the pleading stage of the proceedings.
Rule 8(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
A party may set forth two or more statements of
a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically,
either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses.
When two or more statements
are made in the alternative and one of them if
made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative
statements.
A party may also state as many
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless
of consistency and whether based on legal or
equitable grounds or both.
All statements shall
be made subject to the obligations set forth in
Rule 11.
Professor Moore comments, with respect to the Federal Rules

c~

r:1vil Procedure, upon which the Utah Hules are modeled,
!ternative or hypothetical pleading by its very nature is
,, is

tent.

This, however, is not a valid objection under Rule

iA Moore's Federal Practice paragraph 8.32 at B-290.

8

cf

Rosander v. Larsen, 14 Ut. 2d 1, 376 P.2d 14G (lg(i2).

B. Notice of Respondent's Breach of Implied Covenants is a Factu,
Question, not subject to Summary Dispositior. by the Court Below. Respondent, by way of a string citation, states a genera;
principle that notice of breach of implied covenants, and opportunlt.
to cure, is required before the termination of any oil and gas leas'.
Reference is made to the the appellants'

brief for the argument tha'.

the question before the Court is not the necessity of notice, but tr,,
sufficiency of notice, which is a factual issue, not subject to
summar·y dismissal under either Rule 12(b) or Rule 56.
The affidavit of Joseph Fazzio (R.122) indicates the

hew~

in contact with employees of the respondent and that through his
communications he notified them that respondents should release any
claims to the leased property excluded from the unit because of
respondent's failure to develop it.
Referring specifically to the letter of Carl Noel (R.1511,
Mr. Noel goes through quite a lengthy narrative of the history

oft~

lease to indicate why he feels that Respondent's treatment of
appellants was not in good faith.

Even in this letter, which the

respondent claims gives no notice of its breach of the implied
covenants, Mr. Noel closes his letter by stating:
Three of the original lessors of these lands are
now deceased without having the benefit of
development which they hoped to see. Their

9
heirs deserve better treatment. They deem your
course of action to be actionable, outrageous
conduct. I doubt that your conduct has been in
good faith and fair dealing that the court had
in mind in the Peterson case. (Emphasis added).
(R.155)
Certainly this statement indicates dissatisfaction with
respondent's failure to develop the lands it claims to hold under
lease.

This responsibility to develop alluded to in the Noel letter

lo the same responsibility to develop the leasehold premises implied
'.r1 the lease.

Case law cited in the appellants' brief indicates that

the specificity which respondent claims is required to put it on
notice of its breach of the implied covenants is not necessary if the
facts indicate that the breaching party was aware, or should have been
••are, of its breach.

A failure to develop certain lands which are

purported to be held under lease for over thirty years would seem to
'ive respondent, a very large oil company, notice that it may not be
meeting its responsibilities implied in the lease.
'.t

The mere fact that

made delay rental payments for over thirty years on this parcel of
would call attention to the fact that it was purporting to hold

!a~d

, .ese lands not really by production, but by a technical loophole
•~ich

respondent now claims to be created by certain provisions in the

-e~se

as affected by certain other provisions in the unit agreement.
Even without all the evidence outlined above that notice of

-r1<lPnt's breach was given to it, the Federal District Court for
trict of Kansas has ruled that proof of actual notice in this

10

type of case is not necessary.
Co.

Judge Sam A. Crow, in Amoco Prodw

v. Douglas Energy Company, et al., Civil No. 82-1865 (filed

February 11, 1983) denied Amoco's Motion to Dismiss which is very
similar to respondent's in this case.

(A copy of the Memorandum ar,:

Order filed by the court is attached hereto for the convenience of
court and respondent).

~

In that case Amoco leased many parcels of

property from a large number of lessors for over 35 years.

It

produced natural gas from the property but had failed to drill into
deeper strata where there existed proven natural gas reserves.
Douglas Energy top-leased many of these parcels.

Amoco sued Doug'.JO,

and Douglas, together with many land owners, counterclaimed,
requesting an adjudication that Amoco had breached its implied
covenants for further exploration and requested an order terminatin;
leases ac; to these deeper strata.

There is no all ega ti on on the r·ir·

of the counterclaimants that notice had been given to Amoco of its
breach.

Amoco's motion was centered on alleged lack of notice of l:•

breach.
Judge Crow denied Amoco's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
that the land owners' notice would have been futile and that 35 year·
without exploration was sufficient.

The court rejected Amoco's

assertation that any production under the lease holds all the
As to the question of notice the court stated:
A demand for performance, however, may be cxcusP·i
when it appears it would be futile. ,;ee 5 Y.unt?. -~
Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, ;G2.~ i.1978;.
See also Howarton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., ~l

lez,;P.

11
Kansas 553, 106 P.47, (1910, reversed on other
grounds, 82 Kan. 367, 108 P.813 (1910)).
Memorandum decision at 7-8.
cuurt concluded:
Defendants are entitled to the opportunity to trial
to satisfy waiver of the demand requirement by showing
a manifest intention on the part of Amoco not to
undertake further development or exploration.
(Memorandum decision at 9).

ere also United States v. City of Pawhuska, 502 F.2d 821 (10th Cir.
The affidavit of Joseph Fazzio and all the materials from the

:~74,

file or the Roosevelt Unit, and the actual existence of the release of
the 1954 lease indicate that respondent had no intention of developing
property and that any additional requests that respondent perform

'.~e

were futile.
The Unitization Clause Contained in the 1946 Lease Does Not
Preclude Suit for Breach of Covenants Implied in the Lease.
Respondent asserts a fairly novel position that paragraph 12
J{

the oil and gas lease executed by the appellants and their

P'edecessors in interest, which is a standard Producers 88 lease form,
;re~ludes
'"''

0

an action against respondent for its breach of the

na:1ts implied in the lease to develop the known oil and gas

;r,)jucing formations and to explore further others.
Para~raph

hP

12 of the lease states that the terms of the lease

modified to conform with the terms, conditions and provisions
!lilt

plan.

Paragraph 16 of the unit agreement states:

The development and operation of the land subject
Lo this ar:;ree:nent under the terms and the continuer!

12

operation of the well or wells
drilled in the unit area shall
performance of all obligations
operation with respect to each
separately owned tract subject

now drilled or
be deemed full
for development and
and every part or
to this agreement.

The land subject to the unit agreement include only "land committed.
this agreement."

Since the contraction of the unit, the lands

covered by Case No. 19161 were not within the unit and therefore no:
subject to the agreement.

Development and operation of lands retain'

within the unit certainly cannot be seen to be "full performance
all obligations for development and performance" on

~

non-participatl~

lands.
Respondent, by introducing this issue at this time, also
raises additional factual questions as to whether or not respondent
has met "full performance of all obligations for development and
performance" under the unit agreenen t.

If ful 1 pe rfornance provides

respondent with a defense to the action for breach of the implied
covenants, then the burden is on respondent to prove full performa,.:t
has been rendered.
Paragraph 9 of the unit agreement outlines an involved
program for unit development.

This factual issue cannot be

discussc~

at this point simply because of the difficulty of addressing it at
the appellate level.

It does not appear that the respondent hc1s flt'

an affidavit claiming that it, or its successors and assigns, hav•
performed all the requirements for development under the unit

13

~,,·eement.

In a letter obtained from the files of the United States

'eological Survey (R.229) dated June 30, 1954, from the USGS to Carter
vll Company, then unit operator for the Roosevelt Unit, it appears

that n plan for development was rejected because of a failure to
,roperly develop the unit.

As stated in the letter:

We advised you in approving the temporary plan
of January 11 and in our letters of March 5 and 26
that some drilling should be done this year to
correct the inequities in the participation and
to further develop this large unit area. This
has also been mentioned orally and in connection
with other unit areas; although, we consider the
Roosevelt situation the most noticeable and
critical. Hence, I believe you understand the
situation • • • • •
This Survey has been quite liberal in granting
extensions of time for drilling of additional
test wells seeking a discovery; also in
considering the need for further geologic and
engineering studies, market, climatic, and
other conditions under which discoveries have
been made. However, it becomes more apparent
all the time that such benefits are favorable
mainly to the working interest owners and
usually are detrimental to the royalty and other
interests, who are penalized by the slower
development.
Such parties have sometimes in
the past, and may be more inclined in the
future to refuse to commit their interest to
unit agreements ••••
When a unit area is developed to the point where
the unit operator feels that further development
is not necessary, the area should be contracted
to improve the limits of the participating area
by reasonable 40-acre subdivisions. There is no
justification for keeping all the lands outside
the participating area subject to the unit
agreement.
If the operator does not wish to
drill the land, he should surrender those rights
within a reasonable time in order that someone
else may have an opportunity.
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The gist of the fifth and sixth causes of action in

Case~

19161 and the third and fourth causes of action in Case No. 19160 l
that respondent has not acted reasonably and responsibly in develop'.·
its leasehold interest. No response has been made to these allegatl:other than to question whether or not notice of respondent's bPeachimplied covenants has been given.

The appellants should be given t'.'

opportunity to discover through the means supplied undeP the Pules
of civil pPocedure whether or not the unit operator, who was the agt .
for the respondent in the development of the unit area, complied wi"
the requiPements for unit development.

Even under respondent's

aPguments, without compliance with the unit development plan the
implied covenants contained in the lease are still in effect.
The Tenth Circuit Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) found that these implied
covenants still bind this particular respondent, despite the
respondent's intePpPetation of the lease and unit agreement.

The

court there noted that the potential for abuse by the lessee is
enormous when a lease has been joined to a unit.

Because of this,

lessee's obligation for reasonable development Pemains as to the
acPeage which does not paPticipate in the unit.

Somers v. Haines

Trust and Savings Bank, 566 P.2d 775, 779 (Kan. App. 1977).
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The Tenth Circuit Court has stated:
The practice of unitization by a power granted
the Lessee in advance, if faithfully carried out,
will be fair and profitable both to the lessor and
the Lessee, and is vital to the oil and gas
industry in the interest of conservation of both
natural and material resources.
It should be
upheld, although the grant of power is in general
terms, because it is subject to implied terms that
will prevent arbitrary and unfair dealing, will
require compliance with the implied covenants in the
lease for the benefit of the Lessor and will impose
a rigid standard of good faith on the part of the
Lessee.
Peterson, supra. at 933.
Hespondent claims that the terms of the lease, as affected
)Y the unit agreement, preclude appellants from bringing any action

:or breach of implied covenants to develop and further explore.
:;) citation of authority is contained in respondent's argument on this
r.:int.

It is clear from the cases cited above that the courts differ

''.th respondent on this point.

It should be noted that this argument

also raises additional issues of fact which must be addressed only by
'.~e

trier of facts.
The Judicial Ascertainment Clause is not Relevant at this Point
in the Proceedings.
Another argument introduced by the respondent in its brief

's that the

judicial ascertainment clause contained in the 1946 lease

-·!Jjes termination by the court of the lease on account of

·;;·

jent's breach of the implied lease covenants.
.. 1

First, it should

that tt1ose causes of action requesting termination and

t~tion

of the lease on the basis of breach of the implied
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covenants also contain a request for damages.

The judicial

ascertainment clause only affects forfeiture and cancellation.
Secondly, the judicial ascertainment clause requires a fk
adjudication as to whether or not there exists a failure to perforc,
the part of the respondent.

Judicial economy requires that the

determination be made, allowing a reasonable time for cure or
forfeiture, in a single proceeding.
Finally, in certain situations, such as the present, where
the lessee's breach of its implied covenants is in bad faith, the
court should not allow the lessee to shield its inactivity behind tr.'
judicial ascertainment clause.

As stated by Professor Merrill:

Particular applications of the judicial
ascertainment clauses may be invalid. For
instance, they ought not to apply where the
lessee has been guilty of such fraudulent or
oppressive conduct as to destroy confidence
which must be the basis of a proper relationship
between the lessor and the lessee.
Likewise,
they should be invalid in so far as they attempt
to relieve the lessee from liability of damages
where the alternative decree will not afford the
lessor full recompense for the lessee's wrongful
conduct.
Merrill "Lease Clauses Affecting
Implied Covenants," Southwestern Legal Foundation,
Second Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and
Taxation, 141 at 187 (1951) quoted in 4 Williams,
Oil and Gas Law, §682.4, n.5 at 366.
Texas courts, which are quite experienced in matters si·
to the present one, have rejected judicial ascertainment claus••·
stated in Frick-Reid Suuply Corp.

v. Meers, 52 :.i.W.2cl 11'),

(Tex.Civ.App. 1932):
"We think this stipulation is void.

If its terms

1::-
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were observed, Meers and wife would be required to
file a suit in the district court for the purpose of
adjudicating the questions as to whether there had
been a breach of any implied obligation and whether
oil and gas was being produced in paying quantities.
By the terms of the stipulation, that would end the
suit, even though the facts should be determined
against the lessees. The court would be precluded
from rendering judgment upon such findings.
Except
in certain instances prescribed by statute, courts
do not try cases by piecemeal • • • • Observance by
the court of the terms of this stipulation would
require a trial in which only the facts named in
the stipulation could be judicially ascertained.
Upon the determination of such facts, the lessee,
according to the stipulation, is given a reasonable
time thereafter to comply with his obligations or
surrender the lease, reserving any producing well
and ten acres surrounding it. This would require
at least two trials and two final judgments. It
would require, contrary to the provisions of article
2209, a postponement of the rendition and entry of
the judgment upon the facts ascertained, subject to
the option and caprice of the lessee.
Agreements
relating to proceedings in civil cases and involving
and providing for anything inconsistent with the full
and impartial course of judgment therein are illegal
While both common-law and statutory
arbitrations are favored by the courts, and questions
of fact may be conslusively settled in that way, the
parties cannot by original contract or otherwise
convert the trial and appellate court into mere
boards of arbitration."
The judicial ascertainment clause should not be allowed to
use1 as a device to protect respondent when respondent acts in bad
'1'.Lc,
,, 1

Likewise, 1t should not be used to wear down the appellants
multiplicity of actions.
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IV. DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IIJ BOTH CASES \·IA.
ERRONEOUS ON THE BASIS OF Tl-iE LOWER COURT' s RULI:JC AIJ[J KcSPOIJDE!I: ·
SUPPLEMENTING THEORIES.
A.

The First Cause of Action Involves Several Factual Issues
Unresolvable by Summary Disposition.
In its argument claiming that the first cause of action

fails to state a claim against it, respondent ventures into factua:
issues.

Respondent states that the 1945 leases and the 1946 lease

were significantly different.

According to the respondents, the re;:

reason for entering into the 1946 lease was to enable the parties
strike a different deal.

t:

"Appellants predecessors plainly wanted to

enter into the 1946 lease, because they did it." (Respondent's Br:e:
at 21.

Emphasis in the original).

In light of the history

surrounding the execution of the 1946 lease contained in the letter '
Carl Noel to a vice president of the respondent, (R.151), it

ap;iea~s

that agents for the respondent approached the appellants and their
predecessors in interest requesting a second lease, claiming that
since the seismographic work had been done, which was required unae:
the lease of 1945, respondent wished to obtain a correcting lease
omitting this clause.*
Certainly the question of whether or not the appellants
their predecessors wanted to enter into the 194(1 lease is a queest'

*The court in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Peters0n, s~F•~.
substantiates this:
Phillips completed its seismogr~phic work anj
having determined that the leaseholds lay witnin
a favorable structure, proceeJeJ to taK" ~orre~tinn
leases where there wece r1ir10r errur·s i::

leases.

t:.fJe

J[,if.r

I rial

~-
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f•~t.

not to be summarily disposed of before proper procedural and

__ '_ Jentiary steps had been taken.
Respondent claims that its capacity or lack of capacity to
e~L~r

into binding leases in the State of Utah in 1945 is far from

rertain, implying that it was engaged in only "a few isolated
traflsastions".

(Respondent's Brief at 23-24).

indicate the opposite.

Tlle facts clearly

Rather than being engaged only in "a few

isolated transactions" the respondent was actively involved in leasing
a large portion of the mineral interests in the Uintah Basin.
?hillips Petroleum v. Peterson, supra at 928-929.

By obtaining

Interests in oil and gas leases respondent was certainly "doing
OJsiness" in the State of Utah.
However, the relevancy of this issue is questionable.

;a,_1 enacted and operative at that time states:
[e]
Every contract, agreement and transaction
whatsoever made or entered into by or on behalf
any corporation [failing to comply with the
provisions of Sections 18-8-1 and 18-8-2] or
to be executed or performed within this state
shall be wholly void on behalf of such corporation
and its assignees and every person deriving any
interest therefrom .••• (Section 18-8-5 UCA 1933
Emphasis added).

The
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Although stressed in tile appellants'

brief, it appears L

needs to be emphasized again tllat when a contract is deemed to be
void, it is "null, ineffectual, nugatory, having no legal force or
binding effect, unable in law to support the purpose for wllicll it "'
intended".

Black's Law Dictionary at 1745.
If the statute states that any contract or transaction

entered into by a corporation which has not qualified itself to do
businP.ss within the state is "wholly void," tllen that transaction, '.
a nullity and cannot be ratified.
by itself, revitalize the

1~45

0

Therefore, the 1946 lease cannoc,

leases without the express intention:

the part of the lessors that it do so.
Hespondent attempts to imply that because the statute was
amended in 1961, tile legislature has indicated tllat it had a differt:·
intent.

As mentioned above, and in the appellants' first brief, tne

v.;·

fact tlla t a transaction or contract is void, not voidable, means
breath cannot be blown into it to give it life.

It cannot be ratif:'

without an express indication by the legislature of an intention to
so.

This follows Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (1953) which states,

"No~:

of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared."

See also, Ferrel v. Pingree, 5 Ut. 443, 16 P.

843

(1888).
B.

Failure to Allege a Duty to Speak is not GrouCJcis for 1:1s 1l '
the First Cause of Action with Pre ju l 1 c<'.
0

01

Respondent co:n1•lains that thc;re was !lo .'!lle:;iitiur; ''·'''
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,11 til a duty to disclose the fact that 1t had obtained the 1945
~e8ses

while it was not authorized to do business in the State of

~tah.

According to the respondent's interpretation, the appellants'
to plead this should result in the dismissal of the cause of

'~llJre

oiction.
Rule 8(e)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
"eact. averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.

technical forms of pleading or motions are required."

No

Rule 8(f) goes

on to state, "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial

Justice."
In referring to the concept that fraud should be plead with
~aniculari

ty, Professor Moore states:

There appears a tendency to allow great leniency
where issues are complex, or the transactions
involved cover a long period of time.
The requirement of particularity does not abrogate
Rule 8, and it should be harmonized with the general
directives in subdivisions (a) and (e) of Rule 8 that
pleadings should contain a "short and plain statement of
the defense" and that each averment should be "simple,
concise and direct." 2A Moore's Federal Practice,
Paragraph 9.03 at 9-28.
If there has in fact been a failure to plead all elements of
:cJ
1

wltn particularity, then the proper motion is not a motion to
~.

but a motion for a more definite statement under Rule

l't1e Appellants have Standing to Maintain a Cause of Action
Sounding in Fraud.
Because two of the appellants were not original signors of
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the 1945 leases and the 1946 lease, resµoncent claims that they r.a,'.
no standing.

Respondent admits that one of the appellants, Audrey'..,

Taylor, was an original lessor.

Maxine Taylor Fazzio is her daught•·

and Joseph Fazzio is Maxine's husband.

The appellants have actually

inherited the property, rather than purchased it.
But respondent's argument of lack of standing indicates a
failure to recognize or understand the true basis of the action for
fraud.

Fraud negated the intent necessary for the appellants and

their predecessors to enter into and deliver a new lease in 1946.
Bowman v. Cottrell, 15 Ida. 221 96 P. 936 (1908).

They were not

awa~-

of certain facts, known to the respondent, which were material to th'
appellants' and their predecessors', decision to execute the 1946
lease.

There was no present intent at that time on the part of the

appellants and their predecessors in interest to execute a new lease,
they merely intended to correct certain "minor errors" as indicated'.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, supra.
V.

THE 1946 LEASE WAS NOT OPERATIVE, INDEPENDANT OF THE VOID 1945
LEASES.
Respondent claims that the 1946 lease, by its terms, clear:

indicates the intention of all parties to replace the 1945 leases w1·
the 1946 lease.

This is a factual issue.

The Peterson case,

and the letter of Carl tioel (H .151) raise factual issues

allout

~ra,

tc

0
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:arties' intention in executing the 1946 lease.

Exactly what the 1946

1edse was (that is, whether it was a corrective lease, merely

·Jrrecting mistakes in the 1945 leases, or was a completely new lease,
;nde!Jendent on its own) is unclear from the words contained therein.
":,)rrection" and "in lieu of" together create this ambiguity.
~ppellants'

VI.

Brief at 27 and 28).

THE 1946 LEASE WAS ABANDONED OR SURRENDERED BY RESPONDENT'S
ACCEPTANCE OF THE 1954 LEASE AND ITS SUBSEQUENT RELEASE.
The amended complaint, in the Third Cause of Action in Case

~a.

19161, alleges that respondent's interest in the lands excluded

from participating in the Roosevelt Unit were merged into a 1954 lease
~bich

was released a year later by the respondent.

The respondent

;c•stions why, if this in fact happened, was no action brought from
1J55 until the present challenging respondent's claim.

As is evident

fro~

the affidavit of Joseph Fazzio, the appellants were not aware

~~at

the respondent claimed an interest in the non-participating lands

:Y,erej by Case No. 19161. (R.122, paragraph 2).
'~~·llants

It is obvious that

believed that the 1955 release released respondent's

'·•·rPst in these non-participating lands.
Respondent goes on to raise questions concerning appellants

'''·'t: of rental checks on these parcels.
" uf fact.
,til

Again, this is a

Were appellants aware from these rental checks that

checks covered the non-participating lands?
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Tne

r'_:'Sf:,'1-1 1deri~

'laims tf1dt

the

~aw

"wll l not compl-"l

11 ,

of t11e estates '.)r 1 t ls r:ot in t'.ie i:iterests of the pOJ.rty unle 0

.,

is an intention on the part of the parties that merger exists."
(:iespoT1Jent's Brief at p.31).

As indicated in the appellants' Dr'.'

\at 33! this is a question of fact.
At no time in the entire proceedings has the respondent
attempted to explain the existence of the 1954 lease.

If respnn1•

hel i an interest in the non-participating lands, why did it feel
cocf

P'.le l to enter into a fairly restrictive lease 1dth the less

If tnere is any question of intent, it should be fairly clear tha'
p3rt1.-,s iT1tendecJ that any lease.>iold interest the responjent heU '.:.
t'ie non-participatin,;; lands was merged into the 1954 le3se, and t•:·
this lease evidenced the rights and obligations of the parties as'.
these non-participating lands.
1he issue of surrender is not even addressed by the
fiespowle:1t merely states that since tnis is a "ne>1"

r't..'S!,J:1der-it.

theory, the court is precluded from addressing it.
has

rai~ed

Respondent its•.

in its brief for the first time its theories

concernin~

juJ1r1al ascertainment clause and the preclusion of an acti'.)n for
br·e.L'il of th>" i'Tlplied
dPl,i

or~ration

Of

t~e

C·JvenJ11t~
U~Jit

by

rc'iison of par'a,r,rap•1 12

~~r~e~en~.

•i'.' t· ··
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Attention should again be drawn to the fact that this
ii

tion employs rules of civil procedure which provide for notice
The situation before this court is not one where the battle

,~r

~ave

lJPer1
~,,~,
,c

been clearly drawn by the adversarial proceejings.

There

no answer to the amended complaint, no discovery has been

and no trial has been allowed to the appellants on this matter.

s'1cl1,

;.es~ion

respondent's claim that this court cannot consider the
of whether or not the 1946 lease was surrendered by virtue of

eapondent's acceptance of the 1954 lease, even though those facts
•ern contained in the amended complaint, is not in accordance with
l0

rlying principles and rules governing civil procedure in this

Meferring to the federal rules which are identical to the
:c,',

Rules of Civil Procedure in this matter, it has been said:
The federal rules have avoided one of the sore
spots of code pleading. The federal courts are
not hampered by the morass of decisions as to whether
a particular allegation is one of fact, evidence
or law. All that is required is a "short plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." This requirement should be
observerl.
And pursuant to Rule 8(e), "each
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise
and direct."

*

*

*

lne ~ourts have reco~nized the function of
pleadings under the federal rules is to give fair
n0tice or the clain asserted so as to enable the
:11verse party to answer and prepare for trial,
tn allow for the application of the doctrine of
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res judicata, and to show the type of case
brought, so that it might be assigned to the
proper form of trial.
2A Moore's Federal
Practice, paragraph 8.13 at 8-97 to 8-103. (Emphasis
in original).
Liberality is afforded pleadings because the rules provid,
for discovery of facts and formulation of issues.

The court bel011 j'.

not allow sufficient time for this formulation of issues through the
use of discovery and pretrial conferences.

What is required is tha:

the opposing party be put on notice of the facts underlying the
theories, not specifically the theories themselves.
This Court has addressed this issue in Rich v. McGovern,::
P.2d 1266, 1268 (Utah 1976), stating:
Defendants also contend that the plaintiffs
raised in their brief in this court for the
first time matters which were not presented to
the District Court, and hence should not be
considered here.
The principle is correct.
But its application here is not.
Upon
examination we find that, though the pleadings
and submission speak in generality, the
critical matters recited above pertaining
to plaintiffs' claims of fraud were sufficiently
set forth in the pleadings, affidavits and
depositions.
Here, the record below, through allegations contained

1~:

amended complaint, the letter of Carl Noel (R.l':il), the affidavit::
Joseph Fazzio and exhibits thereto (R.122) and the exhibits

obtal~

from the records of the United States Geologiral Surveys filed cG
Roosevelt Unit (R.122) indicate that chere may have been a surrP"'
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, indonment of respondent's interest in the non-participating lands
acquisition of the 1954 lease covering those lands.

its

These facts also raise the issue of whether Phillips
to abandon its claims under the 1946 lease when it released

'.~~endei

t'" 1954 lease and failed to further develop the non-participating
·"'' 1s.

Abandonment is the voluntary or intentional release of a known

r'.ght.

hook v. James E. Russell Petroleum, Inc, 658 P.2d 1059, 1061

~an.

App.1983).

When a lessee holds a lease but does not exercise

l:s rights for development for a significant period of time the lease

"1aJ be deemed to be abandoned.

Rook, supra at 1061.

,, Humble uil and Refining Co., 419 P.2d 265 (Okla.
.cc.q,er-~urner, 297 P.2d 371

See also Crocker
1966); Kunc v •

(Okla. 1956).

The abandonment, as pointed out in the appellants' brief,
,,,a, 11ot

~e

~ta~1onment
,5

just abandonment of the rights under the lease, but also an
of the purposes for which the lease was granted by lessor.

stateri in Dross Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934 (Okla.

-!"3

to permit the lessee to hold the lease for an unreasonable

.ec1,;t:1 or time for merely speculative purposes, is to allow it to
t~ct

its own interest and to disregard the interest of the lessor.

1itions do not indicate to it that further development will be
cit,lt', it is only fair that, after reasonable time has expired,
: '•·'1.Jer· the u11developed
t

portion of the lease and allow lessor to

11e development by others.
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Once a lease is abandoned it completely terminates the
leasehold interest and the former lessee cannot reacquire mineral
rights without obtaining a new lease.
F.2d 1063, 1070 (8th Cir. 1979).

Superior Oil Co. v. Devon,

~.

Because the action (or more aptly

inaction) by the lessor, notice is not necessary and irrelevant.
Cameron v. Lebow, 388 S.W. 2d 399 (Ky. 1960); Smyth v. Kaplin, 294
S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1956).
Respondent also objects to the appellants' discussion of
novation because, according to the respondents, it is either
repetitive of the questions of merger or inaccurately characterizes
the theory of' novation.

Respondent contends that novation is limite:

to transactions in which the substitute contract contains a new part;,
This is too narrow a definition.

Referring to Black's Law

Dictiona~

(at 1212), novation is tne "substitution of a new contract between t:
same or different parties."

This Court, in Robison v. Hansen, 594

P.2d 867 (Utah 1979) has termed a substitute contract between the sa"·
parties also as a novation.
If novation is, as respondent claims, merely another name
for the merger theory, then respondent's whole objection to the
introduction of surrender is baseless.

These theories rely upon,

basically, the same facts which were plead in the amended complain'.
They all lead to the same conclusion; that is, that respondent and
appellants by entering into the agreement of

r1ar·r-h

11, ll)Sc', "'''
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,, , lease modified the terms of the lease and the unit agreement and
the nature of the interest claimed by respondent in the

:~anged

~on-participating

lands.

When respondent failed to comply with the

terms of this new contractual relationship and released its property
respondent no longer had claim to the non-participating

~nterest,

lands under the 1946 lease.
vu.

THE TEKnS OF THE UNIT AGREEMENT IMPLY THAT NON-PARTICIPATING
LANDS MUST BE RELEASED.
In refuting appellants' argument that language contained in

the unit agreement and the leases in question lead to the conclusion
c'iat non-participating lands must te released, repondent replies only
wit1 general statements of the law.
t~ot

Respondent's general position is

non-participating lands may be held by production on the unit if

:ne unit lands and the non-participating lands are in the same lease.
~•ever,
f1~ts

the language in the unit agreement and the lease, and the

indicate that the circumstances in the instant case are quite

Jiffer·ent.

In none of the cases cited by the respondent is there a

situation similar to this where the lessee is required to pay delay
renta!s on lands excluded from participation in production royalties.
production itself holds those lands, then why did the parties
,., , , j

r"' the lessee to pay delay rentals?
Hespondent appears to agree that if it did not pay these
ntals it would lose all rights it purports to claim in the
1

lands.

Therefore, respondent is holding the
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non-participating lands, not by
delay rentals.

prndu~tl•n1,

but by the payroer1t Ge

The result ls that the lease coverin6 these

non-participating lands becomes a no-term lease, 1. e. a lease wit:,
a primary term which may be held in perpetuity by the lessee, not
through production, but by payment of delay rentals above.

No-terc

leases have long been disfavored by the courts because of their
inherent unfairness allowing sµeculation on the p&rt of the le:see
without requiring the lessee to meet its side of the bargain, that
to produce oil and gas from the leasehold. 2 :::iummers Oil & Gas, ,,:".
Either the lessee's rights to the excluded property are
preserved by payment of delay rentals for a specific term, or its
payment of delay rentals was intended to preserve its rights
indefinitely.

If the latter is the case, then it is so inherer.c:·

unfair and one-sided that the unit agreement, as it pertains to the
non-participating lands, is unenforceable. Federal uil Co. v.
Oil Co., 111 F. 373, aff'd 121 F. 674
Jones, 268 P.

521 (Colo.

(7th Cir. 1902); Lannan v.

19;!b J; National uil & Pipeline Co.

'l'eale, 67 S.W. 545 (Tex. Civ. App.

'ties'''

v.

1902).

CO~ICUJ3IO'J.

If nothing else,

respondent's brief clearly injicatPs t ' '

there are several unresolvej factual issues
causes of action which

pre~luje

t~1eir·

relatin~

to

a~~~1.~

.Jis"licc;;1l 11n J'·r f·'.Jl'° L

the Utah hules of' Civil f-r,,ce:•1ur·c.
develop the evidence, offer proof' ut1 tr1e
and to exercise their ri6nt

trial.

t(J

c\Jr11'r 1 ;r1t~

·1rir'•< JL··
t~,,,_.

1 ,.

r ..-,, 1,· 1:. 11'',~

1r1

ct
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DATED this

11!:.

day of October, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
AMOCO PRODUCTION CCMPANY,
a corporation

Plaintiff
No. 82 1865

Vs.

DOUGLAS ENERGY CCMPANY, INC.
et al
Defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on plaintiff
Amoco Production Company's (Amoco) motion to dismiss counterclaims
of Defendant Douglas Energy Company (Douglas) and individual
lessor defendants for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Rule 12(b) (6), Fed.R.Civ.P.

Amoco also moves for judgment

on the pleadings and a stay of discovery pending resolution
of these motions.

The court, having heard oral arguments

and having reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties, is
now prepared to rule on all pending motions.
Amoco filed this suit seeking a declaration that
top leases granted Douglas by lessor defendants covering
rnmproducing formations constitute an obstruction of Amoco's
leasehold rights (claim 1), a declaration that it is presently
under no obligation to release of record any nonproducing

[XHIBIT "B"

formations

(claim 2), an order enjoining Douglas from acquiri!i

further top leases or otherwise interferring with Amoco's
contractual rights under its leases (claim 3), damages for
tortious interference with its contractual relations with
lessors (claim 4), an order directing Douglas to release of
record its top leases (claim 5), and damages for slander of
title (claim 6).

Amoco's motion for judgment on the pleadings

is directed to claims 1, 2, 3, and 5.

Accompanying its

answer, Douglas asserts as a counterclaim a request for
declaratory judgment that Amoco has breached an implied
covenant for further exploration.

Douglas also has countercla;·

for damages for slander of title.

Individual lessors assert

a single counterclaim of breach of implied covenants for
further exploration and development and request, as does
!

Douglas, partial cancellation of Amoco's leases.
At the outset, the court notes that Amoco has
filed no replies to the counterclaims of Douglas and the

,,

individual lessor defendants.

" states in pertinent part:

i

1

1

Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.,

"After the pleadings are closed,

but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party

,, may move for judgment on the pleadings."

Rule 7(a), Fed.R.Civ

indicates that where a counterclaim is asserted a reply is
,, required before the pleadings are closed.

2

See 5 Wright

&

Miller, Federal Practice

~Procedure,

§1367 at page 687.

Therefore, absent replies to defendant's counterclaims, the
court may consider Amoco's Rule 12(c) motion only if it
first dismisses the counterclaims.

Since the court denies

in part Amoco's motions to dismiss, the motion for judgment
on the pleadings is not properly before the court at this
ti.me and is dismissed without prejudice.

Of course the

court realizes, as do the parties, that the motions to
dismiss address substantially the same issues that are
raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
As to Amoco's motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, the applicable rule is that a claim should
not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) unless it appears
beyond a doubt that a pleader can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Conley'!'.....:_ Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

The factual

allegations of the pleading must be taken as true and all
reasonable inferences must be indulged in favor of the
,,

pleader.

Mitchell'!'.....:_ King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976).

I' Furthermore, pleadings are to be liberally construed to

determine if there is any possibility of recovery.
~_£,

Gast-A-

Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102 (10th

Cir. 1973).

Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim

are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.

3

5 Wright &

\

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §1357 at 598.
Amoco contends that defendants are prevented from
obtaining relief on their counterclaims for breach of implied
covenants for essentially three reasons.

First, it is

contended that the top leases are presently invalid since

they purport to be effective as of the time of their executio:.
Second, it is argued that the top leases constitute an
obstruction relieving Amoco of further responsibility for
performance under any implied covenants.

Third, it is

argued that defendants are prevented from asserting a claim
for lease forfeiture because of absence of prior demand for

performance of implied covenants, and because the counterclait
do not allege a legally sufficient excuse for failure to
make such a demand.
The proposition that Douglas' leases are presently
invalid rests on Amoco's argument that its leases remain
valid as to all formations since production in paying quantit:
has been established.

Amoco contends that this is the test

the court should apply in view of defendants' prior actions
and the assertion in their counterclaims that Amoco's leases
have already terminated as to nonproducing formations.

The

prior actions referred to are the execution of top leases
granting Douglas the right to make demand on any existing
II

!l

4

oil and gas lessee to release of record nonproducing zones,
and Douglas' actual demand for release made prior to the
institution of this lawsuit.

These actions, it is argued,

evidenced an intention to challenge the existing leases as
having already terminated.

Moreover, in view of the principle

that breach of an implied covenant never results in automatic
termination or forfeiture, see Christiansen Y.:. Virginia
Drilling~·

Inc., 170 Kan. 355, 226 P.2d 263 (1951), Amoco

argues that its leases could have previously terminated only
by breach of their express terms.

Therefore, .Amoco contends

that defendants' actions and allegations in effect confine
the issue to whether the habendum clause of its leases has
been satisfied, rather than whether a breach of implied
covenant has occurred.
The court finds this to be an unduly restrictive
characterization of defendants' theory of recovery.

Neither

the counterclaims, nor Douglas' previous demand for release,
nor the top leases themselves disclose an intent to attack
, Amoco's leases on the basis of cessation of production.

Douglas' demand for release could more accurately be characterize(
as premature and hence ineffective, but the court does not
believe this action alone frames the issues now before the
court and renders the top leases necessarily invalid.

5

The

r

mere conferring of the right to demand release is not
determinative where, as here, the leases were expressly
granted subject to all valid preexisting oil and gas leases.
A reasonable interpretation is that the top leases would
become effective only to the extent any existing leases were
determined invalid.

A request for such a determination has

been made in the form of defendants' counterclaims for
partial lease cancellation.

Though the counterclaims express

a legal conclusion that Amoco's leases have terminated as to
nonproducing formations, defendants clearly seek a judicial
determination of termination and request partial cancellation
based on prior

breach of implied covenants.

Defendants'

claims for relief are not insufficient merely because they
request a present determination of a prior breach.
Superior Oil Co.

See

Corp., 458 F.Supp. 1063 (D.Neb.

~Devon

1978), reversed on other grounds 604 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir.
1979); Robinson v. Continental Oil Co., 255 F.Supp. 61
(D.Kan. 1966).

Such a judicial determination would not

,, constitute the legal equivalent of automatic termination
'I
'i

:·

under express lease terms.
The issues raised by defendants' counterclaims arE
whether Amoco, prior to the execution of the Douglas leases
failed to satisfy an implied covenant to explore

6

(assert~·'

by

bot~

Douglas and the individual lessors) or an implied

covenant to Jevelop (asserted by individual lessors} •
countercl~ims

The

are not subject to dismissal under the theory

that Amoco's leases are perpetuated by production.

Similarly,

the proposition must fail that dismissal is appropriate
since the top leases, and Douglas' demand, constitute an
obstruction.

The claims that Amoco has breached its implied

covenants focuses on events prior to execution of the top
leases.
Amoco's third basis for challenging defendants'
counterclaims for cancellation is the more serious from the
vantage point of defendants' ultimate ability to prevail on
the merits.

Normally, a demand for performance of an implied

covenant is necessary before a court will grant a claim for
lease forfeiture.
at 64;

Cowman~

Pac.2d 988

Robinson

~Continental

Oil ££:.._, supra,

Phillips Petroleum Co., 142 Kan. 762, 51

(1935).

The purpose of such a demand is to put

the lessee on notice that he has breached an implied covenant
and provide him the opportunity to perform and avoid the
harsh remedy of forfeiture.
1069.

Superior Oil

Co~,

603 F.2d at

A demand for performance, however, may be excused

where it appears that it would be futile.

See 5 Kuntz, a

Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, S 62. 4 ( 1978 l .

7

See also

Howerton~

Kansas Natural

Gas~·

Bl Kan. 553, 106 Pac. 47

(1910), reversed on other grounds, 82 Kan. 367, 108 Pac. 813
( 1910) .
As to the claims of breach of an implied covenant
to explore, defendants allege that a prior demand for perfonna
was unnecessary, and in effect would have been futile, in
view of an extended period of inactivity despite Amoco's
knowledge of the production potential of the unexplored
fonnations.

It is alleged that Amoco was aware of its

obligations to explore the leases in question as a result of
its production fran deep fonnations in the area, as well as
on the basis of available test data indicating the carunercial
production potential of the nonproducing fonnations.

It is

not alleged that any individual lessors ever demanded
perfonnance of implied covenants to explore or develop prior
to granting the top leases.

However, during oral presentatioc

counsel for defendants argued that discovery might be helpful
in revealing relevant carununications between Amoco and
lessor defendants.
Amoco refers the court to the recent Eighth Circuit
, 1

1

decision of Superior Oil

~~Devon

Corp., supra, wherein

the court held that the notice and demand requirement is not
waived by the mere passage of what is deemed to be an
unreasonable period of time.

At trial defendants may wel

have to show more than a mere passage of time to satisfy

8

I

waiver of the notice and demand requirement.

As to a threshold

motion to dismiss, however, it is sufficient the defendants
allege futility based on Amoco's inactivity and its knowledge
of production potential of the deeper formations.

Defendants

are entitled to the opportunity at trial to satisfy waiver
of the demand requirement by showing a manifested intention
on the part of Amoco not to undertake further develo?Dent or
exploration.
While the counterclaims for partial cancellation
sufficiently state a claim for relief, Douglas' individual
claim for damages must be dismissed.

Douglas has indicated

that it is proceeding on the theory that Amoco's leases
should be declared invalid as to the deeper formations
because of a prior breach of an implied covenant to explore.
Douglas does not contend that Amoco's leases expired under
any express lease provisions.

However, the counterclaim for

damages is premised upon Amoco's failure upon demand to
release of record the deep formations.
The court notes that in Kansas there are statutory
provisions for obtaining release of terminated or forfeited
oil and gas leases.

See K.S.A. 55-201,

~ ~·

These

statutes provide the basis for recovery of damages for
failure upon demand to release of record a lease that has

9

terminated by express terrr.s or has been judicially deterr 1 c.
to be for felt e::J .
\<.1-.1 le Dowg las states it does not rely upon the
statwtory scheme as the basis for its damage claim,

it is

clear that any claim for damages resulting frcrn a failure tc
release titles of record requires an obligation to do so at
the tl.1!1e the demand is made.
Douglas' claim for damages for slander of its
titles is inconsistent with its claim for cancellation of
its leases as to the deep formations.

Under the latter

cla=. Amoco's leases remain valid unless,
invalid.

To prevail on the former claim,

and until, declare
it must be shown

that A.'1'.oco had a prior obligation to release formations of
record.

J\moco could have been placed under such an obligaL:

only if its leases had been rendered invalid by their expres•
ter.:-.s or by a prior judicial finding of forfeiture.

If the

leases are presently capable of coexisting, as the court ha!
herein found,

it follows that neither party may be require:

to release its leases of record until the court has made a
final deten:-.1nat1or. of the issues presented in this case.
The court has already indicated during oral

arg~

that disco-:ery '•1111 be s:ayed perid1nci rescl'1t ion of thr

motions

no~

~~~0~

co~s1~er~t:c~.

H ,-,....;e ._.

cr ,

t

~

c c O'.....: rt

n ,""·.,

deems it appropriate to enter a further discovery order
consistent with its decision to bifurcate trial of this
action.

Having considered prior representations of the

parties concerning bifurcation as to the issues of liability
and damages, the court believes that bifurcation pursuant to
Rule 42(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., represents an expeditious and
econc:rnical procedure for resolution of this action.

Accordingly,

discovery will be restricted to the issue of liablity.

The

court recognizes there may be instances where discovery
might appropriately overlap issues of liability and damages.
If and when this occurs, discovery need not be restricted as
herein ordered if the parties can agree.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that pliantiff's motion
for judgment on the pleadings is hereby dismissed without
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to
d1src.iss defendants' counterclaims requesting lease cancellation
are denied, and that plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant
Douglas'

counterclaim for damages is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be bifurcated

for separate trials of the issues of liability and damages,
and that discovery be restricted to the issue of liability
Pxrept

~here

the parties can agree otherwise.
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Dated this

//-fj_

day of February, 1983, at

Wichita, Kansas.

Sam A. Crow

u.

ii

I

1:
,j

12

S. District Judge

